I. INTRODUCTION

R
esearchers have examined the relationship between state tax policies and business location decisions in a number of contexts and over many years (for example, Burnes, Neumark, and White, 2011; Funderburg et al., 2013; Chirinko and Wilson, 2008; Reed, 2008; Fox and Murray, 2004) . However, conclusions reached in these studies may not hold for retailers selling goods and services online. E-tailers can locate their revenue generating websites anywhere without affecting their customers' shopping experience and can often exploit nationwide markets with physical locations in only one or a few states. These characteristics provide e-tailers with more locational flexibility than their bricks and mortar counterparts, and this flexibility in turn may heighten the potential influence of state tax policies on decisions about where to locate key operational assets. Indeed, location may have a different meaning for e-tailers than for traditional retailers.
As e-tailers grow, so do their needs to locate support services such as executive/sales offices and fulfillment centers at sites outside their home state or website location, and the existence of home state effects suggests that people have more confidence in firms near their residences.
1 States wishing to attract or retain these businesses need to know how their policy choices affect the location decisions of this unique and rapidly growing sector of the economy. The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence location decisions and estimate their relationship with revenues and employment.
The growth in e-commerce has dramatically altered U.S. business practices. By 2011, business to business and business to consumer e-commerce totaled $4.1 trillion and had grown at an annual compounded rate of 13.0 percent since 2000.
2 At the same time, the technological revolution and the changes in business practices have key economic implications for state and local governments. Sellers only collect sales tax at the time of sale if the seller has nexus in the destination state, and individual consumers who are not charged sales tax typically do not pay the corresponding use tax imposed on the purchase by their state of residence. Business purchasers are more compliant with the use tax than consumer purchasers, but estimates are that business use tax compliance is the worst of any tax remitted by businesses, with non-compliance in one state estimated at 23 percent of sales tax liabilities (Valz, 2010) .
This tax evasion reduces the tax-inclusive price of the product or service, and e-tailers appear to arrange their affairs to avoid establishing nexus and therefore a sales tax collection responsibility in some states. E-tailers can avoid establishing nexus in a state by ensuring that their degree of physical presence does not rise to the level determined to establish nexus by that state. 3 This has caused state sales tax bases to shrink as e-commerce grows, and therefore states have seen a steady erosion in sales and use tax collections as e-commerce has grown.
4 Annual e-commerce sales tax revenue losses are estimated to be $11.4 billion or 3.8 percent of total sales tax liabilities for 2012 (Bruce, Fox, and Luna, 2009 ) and will likely continue to grow rapidly, at least for the next several years.
States have attempted to reclaim the sales tax base but are constrained by current nexus rules, which require sellers to have a physical presence in a state before being required to collect sales and use taxes. Further, states must balance revenue needs with the reality that companies, and especially those involved in e-commerce, are more able than ever to avoid or abandon jurisdictions with what businesses perceive are punitive tax policies. Hoopes, Thornock, and Williams (2014) find that avoiding collection responsibilities for online purchases provides e-tailers with a competitive advantage reflected in stock prices, and companies take steps to maintain this advantage. For example, Amazon.com, 1 As discussed in the literature (Einav et al., 2014) , e-commerce research has not investigated how much presence is necessary to create a home state effect, so it is unclear whether a fulfillment center is sufficient. 2 "2010 E-Commerce Multi-sector Data Tables," U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/econ/ estats/2010/all2010tables.html. 3 We discuss nexus-creating activity in more detail below. 4 Firms that have a large online presence are referred to as e-tailers. Many of these businesses also have traditional bricks and mortar outlets; however, their online operations are often separately incorporated. the country's largest online retailer, discontinued its associates program in a number of states that changed their nexus rules, and it threatened to move its distribution center in Texas and to not locate centers in South Carolina and Tennessee when those states asserted that the warehouses created nexus in their respective states. As a result, Amazon was able to negotiate favorable resolutions to prior sales tax issues.
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In this study, we examine how state tax policies affect the propensity of firms to establish nexus in each state. Specifically, we combine a database containing sales and other operating data for the nation's largest e-tailers (expressed in terms of state-level indicators) with a panel of state-level policy and economic data to estimate state-level regressions of a series of nexus measures on a vector of policy variables and other controls. Nexus is a cost to firms because it entails a tax compliance responsibility and presumably a higher tax-inclusive price for the firm's product or service; therefore, firms' desire to avoid nexus is expected to rise as this cost increases. Offsetting these costs is the operational advantage of expanding the firm's physical presence, such as access to a qualified workforce and proximity to important production or distribution partners. Furthermore, as a firm sells more in a jurisdiction, it may create a need for more nexus activities, such as engaging third parties to install or repair products or taking exchanges or returns. We examine how state policies affect a firm's decision to establish nexus and then examine how overall establishment of nexus is linked to outcomes of primary interest to states, including tax revenues and employment.
We identify our firms from Internet Retailer's Top 500 Guide and then determine in which states each of these firms claims to have sales tax nexus. 6 Our nexus measures are derived from hand-collected data indicating the states for which each e-tailer collects sales taxes on online sales, aggregated to the state level. Our baseline model includes state policies relating to the sales tax, but we augment the model with various corporate tax variables that have been documented to impact state economic development (Wasylenko, 1997) . Our evidence suggests that firms prefer to locate in large states to be near their large markets, but this propensity decreases as sales tax rates increase and sales tax bases broaden to include more transactions. We generally do not find evidence that state corporate tax variables (i.e., income tax rates, apportionment factors, throwback rules, and LLC taxes) have any effect on our nexus measures, indicating that firms are not looking at nexus as a traditional business location decision. In a separate set of regressions, we find that states with higher e-tailer nexus tend to have higher total and retail employment when the sales tax rate is low. We also find limited evidence that states with higher e-tailer nexus have greater revenues, especially in the presence of higher sales tax rates.
Our study extends the literature in several ways. First, the research examines the timely and important topic of sales tax nexus, which largely remains unexamined in the empirical literature. Second, the results of this study contribute to the state tax literature by demonstrating the importance of state tax policies on nexus, and in particular nexus for e-tailers. Because traditional bricks and mortar firms still dominate any measure of retail business activity, the effects of state policies on the fast-growing e-commerce sector are hard to parse from broad-based studies of business activity. The ease with which an e-tailer can exploit a market without physical presence marks a fundamental difference between their business model and that of traditional bricks and mortar retailers. While many of the companies included in our study have traditional bricks and mortar operations, these data allow us also to focus on e-commerce firms and the e-commerce divisions of bricks and mortar businesses and better understand how state tax policies affect these firms. Finally, this study should be of interest to policy makers, as the results suggest that high state rates and broad bases appear to reduce the propensity for e-commerce firms to locate business functions that create a sales taxable presence in those states.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides additional information on nexus. The third section develops a simple theoretical framework that serves as the underlying motivation for our empirical analysis. We present our data and research model in the fourth section. The fifth section contains results on nexus and on the relationship between nexus and state level outcomes. The final section provides an overall conclusion.
II. SALES TAX NEXUS
Under the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution, a state can only tax businesses that have sufficient contact with, or physical presence in, that state. Nexus requirements for income and sales taxes vary, and the rules for each broad category of tax differ from state to state. 7 Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Quill more than 20 years ago, physical presence of any kind in the destination state is the standard for sales tax nexus. More specifically, vendors are exempt from sales and use tax collection responsibilities if their "only connection with customers in the [taxing] state is by common carrier or the United States mail."
8 The guidelines established by the Court are intended to provide businesses and state governments with a bright line test that "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes." Current nexus standards rely on this ruling for general guidance, but for a number of reasons this sales and use tax nexus standard can no longer be interpreted as a bright line test. This section briefly outlines the general sales tax nexus rules and then discusses recent developments and state efforts to expand the activities that can cause sellers to have nexus in the destination state.
A business establishes physical presence by owning or leasing almost any tangible property within a state. For example, a business can establish nexus by owning or leasing land or real property, storing goods in a public warehouse, owning display racks, and shipping in-process inventory to a state for further processing. The Quill decision held that nexus is not established if a vendor ships goods via common carrier or U.S. mail, but nexus can be established by using company owned vehicles or third party distributors to deliver or pick up goods within the state. Less obvious forms of nexus-creating physical presence are having a local phone number (in 10 states) or being listed in local phone books (in eight states). Simply maintaining a local bank account or a P.O. Box in the destination state creates nexus in a small number of states.
Nexus is also established in any state in which an employee provides services. These services can be provided by an employee based at an in-state office, or by employees traveling into the state to provide a wide range of services. Examples include employees making sales calls or providing repair services on equipment in the state. Less obvious types of employee activities can also establish nexus. For example, an employee who commutes across state lines establishes nexus for the employer, but only in the state in which he or she works. However, if the employer reimburses that employee for home office expenses, most states treat working from that home office as a nexus producing activity in the employee's state of residence.
In response to perceived significant losses of state sales and use tax revenue due to rapidly expanding remote sales, many states have aggressively expanded their definition of nexus-creating activities. 9 The most important recent developments involve nexus claims based on affiliate or attributional relationships between the remote seller and an in-state entity (Duncan and McGahan, 2011) . 10 For example, states traditionally respected the existence of separately incorporated entities within a controlled group. This enabled a company with a large network of traditional outlets (e.g., Barnes and Noble Booksellers) to separately incorporate their online operations (e.g., barnesandnoble.com) and ignore the physical outlets for purposes of sales and use tax nexus. This strategy is now increasingly ineffective. Affiliate nexus statutes look solely to the retailer's relationships with in-state retailers and whether they share ownership or other characteristics, including trademarks, similar products, and similar names. When these relationships exist, nexus is asserted through the in-state firm to the remote seller. For example, many states simply disregard separately incorporated entities within an ownership group. Affiliate nexus is often asserted if the wholly or partially owned instate entity performs any services on behalf of the remote seller. In some states, nexus is asserted if a seller establishes contractual relationships with unrelated third parties to perform services on its behalf, such as installation or repair services.
The newest frontier of affiliate nexus is illustrated in so-called "Amazon laws," or click-through nexus statutes. Amazon.com encourages unrelated third parties with an online presence ("associates") to display a link to Amazon.com on their website. If customers click the link and make a purchase on Amazon.com, Amazon.com pays a referral fee or commission to the associate. Under the click-through nexus statutes, states assert nexus on Amazon.com and other businesses with similar arrangements if any of the associates that meet certain de minimis sales thresholds are based in-state. New York was one of the first states to enact an Amazon law. Amazon.com contested the laws in court, but New York State prevailed. However, a court in Illinois ruled for Amazon.com, though the decision was reached on procedural grounds and not on the merits of affiliate nexus. These laws are an expansive interpretation of affiliate nexus, and their existence indicates that states aggressively assert nexus on remote sellers. Amazon.com has cancelled or threatened to cancel associate relationships in states with these rules, and in some cases, has reached agreements to collect the tax. Amazon has recently begun to advocate for states' ability to require remote firms to collect sales tax on their behalf, after many years of lobbying against this policy. Amazon appears to believe that consumers place a high value on their ability to obtain purchases quickly, so Amazon has modified its behavior by expanding the number of distribution centers across the country to facilitate rapid delivery to buyers.
III. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
We focus in this paper on (1) the relationships between state-level policies and firmlevel sales tax nexus decisions; and (2) how nexus decisions are related to state outcomes. Consider a representative firm that is deciding whether to establish nexus in a state. The firm will establish nexus if doing so increases the firm's after-tax profits derived from that state.
11 Define N as an observable indicator for sales tax nexus, equaling 1 in the presence of nexus and 0 otherwise. 12 The representative firm's profits from any particular state, defined as total revenues net of production and transportation costs, can be expressed as
where q(N) and p(N) are the quantity sold and net-of-tax price charged in the state, both of which depend on N, c is the average production cost (which can be assumed to be 11 We model the decision process for a representative firm deciding on whether to create nexus in a single state to motivate the empirical analysis. In reality, firm decisions should be made based on maximizing national profits rather than profits in a single state, and firms should make decisions simultaneously across states on where to create nexus. A more comprehensive model would maximize an equation similar to (1) below, summed across all states and would allow for factors such as how establishment of nexus in one state could lower transaction costs for other nearby states where no nexus is created. A key addition would be that a national model would result in cross-state terms in (2). While we abstract from such issues in our simple theoretical motivation, we discuss analysis of cross-state effects in the special auto regression (SAR) results. 12 One can think of N as the observed outcome based on a latent index, N*, which captures the many firmspecific costs and benefits of establishing nexus. When N* reaches some critical level, the firm establishes nexus in the state, switching N from 0 to 1.
constant for a given production technology), and t(N) accounts for per-unit transaction costs, such as transportation costs and compliance costs 13 associated with having to collect and remit sales taxes.
14 Note that this specification allows for some degree of market power, such that the firm has some control over the net-of-tax price it charges for its product. This allows for the possibility of forward-shifting of the sales tax to final consumers. 15 The impact of nexus on state-specific profits can therefore be written as follows, where x' indicates the first derivative of x with respect to N, 16 our nexus indicator
Firms will choose to establish nexus in a state when the net impact on profit, the expression in (2), is non-negative (and, more generally, is large enough to offset any reduction in profits in other states that are not explicitly modeled here). In terms of the equation, the establishment of nexus would imply that the marginal revenue gains (inclusive of transportation cost savings) exceed the marginal production and transaction costs, or
The marginal revenue component of this inequality represents the impact of nexus in terms of the change in quantity sold multiplied by the sale price, plus a second component that is based on the effects of changes in the price and in transaction costs. It is important to point out that q' is not unambiguously positive or negative. On one hand, the establishment of nexus can create a sales boost through a home-state effect. Specifically, as documented by Ellison and Ellison (2009) and Einav et al. (2014) , instate shoppers might reward in-state vendors with greater sales, all else equal. On the other hand, the requirement to collect and remit sales taxes from shoppers in the state might lead to a reduction in sales volume if shoppers had grown accustomed to making effectively tax-free purchases from the formerly out-of-state firm. For example, Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2014) find that households reduce purchases at Amazon.com by 9.5 percent after changes in state laws require the company to collect sales taxes on all sales in the purchaser's state. We anticipate that these effects hinge not only on the size of the state's market, but also on the level of the sales tax rate, the breadth of the sales tax base, the availability of other e-tailers who sell the same product without collecting the sales tax, other features of state sales tax systems, and other factors such as the firm's products and market share. 13 There is no current research on compliance costs. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) estimates that the national average state and local retail sales tax compliance cost in 2003 was 3.09 percent of sales tax collected for all retailers, 13.47 percent for small retailers, 5.2 percent for medium retailers, and 2.7 percent for large retailers. 14 Property and other taxes paid by corporations are not considered in this model. 15 In a small open economy, the tax implemented by one jurisdiction can be forward shifted only if sellers have some market power. 16 Nexus is a discrete rather than continuous firm decision for each state, but this continuous discussion highlights the factors that firms should consider in making the choice.
A similar discussion pertains to the effects of nexus on price. Depending on the firm's ability to shift the burden of the tax onto its customers, p' may be positive or negative. In the presence of over-shifting, as discussed by Poterba (1996) and documented by Besley and Rosen (1999) , p' will be positive. Otherwise, in the case of less than full shifting (i.e., shared incidence) of the sales tax, p' will be negative. Less than full shifting or even no shifting may be more likely in the current environment as, for e-commerce goods, consumers have easier access to cross-border shopping than was available during the time periods analyzed in these earlier studies. No shifting is possible if residents can always purchase from remote vendors that do not collect the tax, but the home-state effect and other characteristics associated with servicing residents make this unlikely.
As with the quantity effects discussed in the preceding paragraph, we anticipate that these price effects will depend on the state's economic and sales tax structures. While the sign of p' is therefore ambiguous, we assume that the establishment of sales tax nexus provides a reduction in transportation costs to the firm that offsets the relatively fixed burden of compliance costs, such that t ' < 0. We recognize that this benefit would be somewhat attenuated in the event that the firm had already established nexus in another nearby state within the same region; we return to this possibility in our empirical analysis below.
The marginal cost component on the right side of the above inequality captures the effects of production and transportation costs as they operate through changes in the quantity sold. Unsurprisingly, the firm will only establish sales tax nexus when the marginal revenues from doing so exceed the corresponding marginal costs. The final decision depends on the relative impacts of a state's economic and tax structure on quantity, price, and transportation costs.
It is useful for illustrative purposes to consider two simplified cases in which only one of the two main variables -price or quantity -changes at a time in response to the establishment of sales tax nexus. In the case in which only the price changes (i.e., when q' = 0), the profit-maximizing condition for establishing nexus becomes
which implies that p' ≥ t '. Intuitively, the firm will therefore establish nexus in the state as long as (1) it will be able to charge a higher price ( p' ≥ 0, given that t ' is assumed to be negative), or (2) in the more likely event that the price falls less than the transactions costs, i.e., when the net transaction cost savings exceed the revenue loss that stems from the price reduction. In the alternative case in which the quantity sold changes in response to the firm's establishment of sales tax nexus while the price remains constant (i.e., when p' = 0), the condition for establishing nexus simplifies to
In this case, the interpretation of (5) depends on whether quantity increases or decreases. When q' > 0, the revenue gain (at the constant price) that arises from the additional sales volume, when combined with the transaction cost savings, must exceed the additional production and transaction costs created by the increase in sales. In this case firms will establish nexus if the additional profits from greater sales and reduced transport costs exceed any added compliance costs of collecting sales taxes for the state. Alternatively, when q' < 0 , the transaction and production cost savings must offset the revenue losses from the reduction in quantity sold.
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To summarize, the representative firm will establish nexus in a state if it stands to gain profit via an increase in quantity sold or price and/or a reduction in per-unit transaction costs. The firm might still establish nexus in cases in which quantity or price falls as long as the other impacts are sufficiently large to generate marginal profits. The direction and magnitude of each of these component changes will inevitably depend on the sales tax rate, the breadth of the sales tax base, the size of the market, the additional sales tax compliance costs, and a variety of other characteristics of the state in question.
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
While it would be interesting and useful to explore these issues at the firm level, the multitude of state-specific nexus choices for each firm complicates such an empirical analysis. The above theoretical exercise is essentially repeated for each sales-taxing state, such that an appropriate empirical consideration would require a fairly complex multinomial logit framework with a large number of possible choices in an ever-changing longitudinal setting. Additionally, while one could estimate simple panel regressions with firm and state variation, such an approach would not easily account for the various relationships across the observations within the data. One firm's nexus outcome in a particular state could feasibly be related both to other firms' outcomes for that state as well as their own outcomes in all other states.
Given these issues and the additional fact that the key policy variation occurs at the state rather than firm level, we have chosen to use firm-level data on where online retailers collect sales taxes to create indicators of nexus at the state level. We combine this condensed nexus data with a detailed panel of state tax policy information and other controls for the purposes of our empirical work. Our basic econometric model specifies an aggregated measure of sales tax nexus in state i in year t as a function of state policy and other controls
where Nexus is our measure of the extent to which our sample of online retailers has nexus in the state, SPI is total state personal income as a measure of market size, Rate is the state's general sales tax rate, Base is a measure of the breadth of the state's general sales tax base, 18 the β terms are estimable regression coefficients, α is a state fixed effect, γ is a year fixed effect, and ε is a random disturbance. Base accounts for crossstate differences in the propensity to tax different ranges of purchases and Rate for the height of the levy. Together Base and Rate determine the average effective tax rate. We augment this basic specification in alternative scenarios by including other state-level controls or accounting for cross-border effects as discussed below.
We derive our measures of nexus from hand-collected information for a large sample of online retailers. Specifically, for a series of prior projects, we visited each company's web site and attempted to place hypothetical orders from each sales-taxing state.
19 If the company added sales tax to the purchase, that company-state pair is coded as a one (and zero otherwise). We gathered nexus information for the 100 largest companies (in terms of online sales in 2005) in 2006, and the largest 50 and a sample of 50 other top-500 companies in 2008. For the 2010 data, we include any companies from the 2006 and 2008 data that were still operating, plus a number of additional companies, for a total of 179 companies. We expanded this sample slightly to 182 companies in 2011 and significantly to 297 in 2012. Unfortunately, no reliable and consistent source of historical data of this nature is publicly available, so we are limited to what we had already collected in earlier years.
20 Further, our model is designed to explain location decisions of e-tailers and not retail activity through bricks and mortar stores. Therefore, we omitted the 25 firms that had presence in all 45 sales taxing states in all years of our data, under the presumption that these firms are not making the types of decisions characterized by our model. 21 This set included firms such as Apple, Sam's Club, Walmart, and Home Depot. The omission of these firms did not alter the statistical results.
We are left with a matrix of nexus information for a reasonably large sample of firm-state pairs for these five years, which we aggregate to the state level in several ways. We aggregate to the state level in this first analysis of nexus because the model focuses on how state level policy, as opposed to firm attributes, impacts the behavior of firms. In addition, every firm is confronted with the potential to locate in all 45 sales-taxing states, so estimating a firm level model requires an extremely complex logit model with each firm's decision to locate in each state a function of all 45 states' characteristics.
18 Separation of the base into items purchased by households versus those purchased by businesses might be useful if the nexus creating firms responds differently to these groups, but the data to do this are not available. Further, our analysis is by state and not by firm, so the distinction is not critical to our study. 19 We are grateful to Beth Howard for sharing the 2006 nexus data, which were collected for other projects.
See Howard (2007) for more details about the 2006 data. 20 We determined whether a firm has nexus in a state annually. Accordingly, even if a firm's nexus status was unchanged from one sampled year to the next, we did not assume a nexus status during the intervening years in an attempt to create additional data. In a few cases, firms collected tax one year in a state and did not collect the tax in the following year. 21 A smaller number of other firms also had nexus in 40 to 44 states but were retained because they had some additional places that they could locate.
The number of firms with nexus is measured three ways. First, we simply count the number of companies that collect sales taxes on online purchases by residents of a state (Nexus 1). For example, a state having a value of 50 for this variable indicates that 50 of the companies in our data collected sales taxes on purchases from that state in that year. Our inclusion of year fixed effects accounts for the fact that we have a varying number of companies in the data each year. 22 We also develop additional nexus measures. Recognizing that online companies are heterogeneous, our second nexus measure (Nexus 2) is the share of total online sales among the companies in our data that occur in companies that collect sales taxes on online purchases by residents of a state. This measure allows larger companies (in terms of the dollar value of sales) to have a larger impact on our nexus measure because we are weighting firm nexus by the firms' sales and dividing by total sales for firms in our sample. Company size/sales differ dramatically in some cases, and Nexus 2 allows us to account for how state characteristics can have different effects on firms of varying sizes. For example, in 2012 Amazon.com had sales of over $48 billion while GourmetGiftBaskets.com had sales of only $16 million. Once calculated, a value of 50 for this measure indicates that the companies collecting sales taxes on online purchases from that state represent 50 percent of the total dollar value of online sales among companies in our sample in that year. Hence, two states with the same number of companies collecting tax could have very different values of our second nexus measure, depending on the mix of sales among companies with nexus.
For the purposes of calculating Nexus 2, we draw online sales data from Internet Retailer's Top 500 Guide in each year. Such sales data are available for a large subset of the companies for which we have nexus data. One shortcoming of this measure is that a small number of very large online retailers can dramatically influence the nexus measure. For example, Amazon.com represented over 28 percent of the online sales among companies in our data. States with a nexus connection to Amazon will thus have much higher values of Nexus 2. We explore the implications of this fact in our analysis below.
Our final nexus measure (Nexus 3) seeks to account for the share of sales that a firm can expect to make to a particular state and the size of the firm's sales. It is on this share of sales that the firm will need to collect the sales tax if a firm chooses to create nexus in the state. Specifically, Nexus 3 pre-multiplies Nexus 2 by the state's share of total national (adjusted) sales tax collections. 23 The state shares are driven by Census of Governments data on total sales tax collections, adjusted to be more consistently defined across the states according to the work of Mikesell (2011) .
24 Specifically, we transform 22 Of course, our fixed effects approach does not account for the influence that differing number of firms have on the variances across years in the panel, and outliers may have greater effects on the results if the number of firms and variances rise over the years. We experimented with indexed nexus measures that are mean-constant over time (at 100) and found our results to be qualitatively similar to those reported here. 23 See http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/. 24 For example, Kentucky and South Carolina tax automobile sales at the same tax rate but use a different tax. A series of annual studies by John Mikesell provides comparable data for each year; Mikesell (2011) is the last of these papers that we use for this analysis.
the Census data to a more consistent measure of state and local sales tax collections in each year, and then we compute each state's share of the national total collections. This is intended to apportion total online sales activity to the states in a way that recognizes that residents of states with high sales tax rates or broad sales tax bases are likely to make more online purchases than residents of other states, 25 and follows the method of Bruce, Fox, and Luna (2009) .
26 Figures 1-3 provide maps to show the three definitions of nexus used in our empirical models.
Our basic model allows for the expectation that firms are most likely to make their nexus decisions on the basis of proximity to markets. In other words, we expect online firms to be more likely to locate, all else equal, in larger states to be near their market or because firms may be more likely to startup in larger states (because there is a larger population). 27 Our measure of size, state personal income (measured in billions of dollars), is intended to approximate the size of the potential retail marketplace in each state.
Our key sales tax variables of interest are the state general sales tax rate (in percentage terms) and a measure of the breadth of the sales tax base (in billions of dollars). We recognize that focusing exclusively on the state-level sales tax rate ignores the important 25 See Ellison and Ellison (2009) and Goolsbee (2000) . 26 To be sure, as described below, we also control for the sales tax rate and base in our regressions. Nonetheless, our construction of Nexus 3 permits a broader consideration of the relative size of each state in terms of actual sales tax revenues and is thus intended as an improvement relative to Nexus 2. 27 Our data do not permit a direct test of which of these explanations is most important. Note: Nexus 3 = Tax collections-weighted share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state. Source: Internet Retailer's Top 500 Guide, www.top500guide.com, U.S. Census Bureau e-commerce statistics, www.census.gov/econ/estats, and authors' calculations functions of local sales taxes in a number of states, but our focus in this analysis is on state-level policy variables. Further, the local sales tax operates on an origin basis in a number of states (such as Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio). As a result, the effects of intrastate local sales tax rates on situs within a state could be important and significantly influence the outcome of the analysis. Also, the state sales tax rate may be the important signal to the market on the rates that must be collected.
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Our measure of the tax base uses the work of Mikesell (2011) and simply divides adjusted state tax collections by the state tax rate. Given that we are separately controlling for state personal income, states with higher values of this tax base measure will have statutorily broader sales tax bases. We interact both the tax rate and tax base variables with state personal income to allow the impact of size on nexus to vary with both tax measures and to simultaneously allow the impacts of the rate and base variables to vary with the size of the state economy. 29 We also anticipate that a state's involvement in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) may have impacted firm-level nexus decisions, so we include a variable representing the number of years a state has been a member of the SSTP. To be a member of the SSTP, states are required to adopt a series of measures to conform their sales tax regime with other SSTP members and to ease compliance burdens on selling firms. Because states join the SSTP hoping they will eventually be able to tax e-commerce, firms may avoid SSTP states for location decisions. In separate specifications, we also include an indicator for whether the state has adopted a so-called "Amazon law." Theoretically, it is not clear whether these new laws would add to our measures of nexus (i.e., if asserting nexus actually creates and maintains nexus among online companies that formerly did not have nexus) or have no effect (i.e., if Amazon laws drive online companies to eliminate their affiliate programs in the state -as Amazon.com has done in some states -or otherwise cause firms to avoid locating there in the first place). Amazon laws will have a positive effect if firms do not eliminate their affiliate programs or otherwise respond to the new legislation, and otherwise should have no effect. Our analysis will be the first to test whether state Amazon laws have been effective at establishing nexus for some firms and thereby restoring part of the shrinking sales tax base in the states that have implemented them.
In an additional set of models we consider the possibility that corporate income tax policies might affect sales tax nexus. It is feasible that aggressive state efforts to restore 28 We thank David Agrawal (2014) for access to data on the average local tax rate by state. Our results were re-estimated using the combined state and average local tax rate, and both the variation and the explanatory power of the models were reduced. 29 To be sure, Nexus 3 is indirectly correlated with the state sales tax rate and base breadth (i.e., states with higher rates or broader bases will have slightly higher values of Nexus 3). Despite the fact that Nexus 3 is based on state shares of total state and local sales tax collections, this may still cause some upward bias (in absolute value terms) in our estimated coefficients on the rate and base variables (and their interactions with personal income). We therefore view estimates of rate and base effects in our Nexus 3 specifications as upper bounds.
shrinking corporate income tax bases might have had spillover effects on sales tax nexus or that factors that affect the location of corporations for income tax purposes could also affect sales tax nexus. These effects could be positive or negative. To account for these cross-tax effects, we include the top corporate income tax rate, the percentage weight on the sales factor in the corporate income tax apportionment formula, and indicators for a series of corporate tax "base recapture" measures including combined reporting requirements, throwback rules, withholding requirements for state taxes on LLCs and LLPs, and the existence of entity-level taxes on LLCs and LLPs. As with our analysis of Amazon laws, it is interesting to see whether these corporate tax measures have any bearing on our sales tax nexus measures. We also explore the possibility that state-level nexus measures are not necessarily independent across space. For example, we can think of a particular firm's decision to establish nexus in one state as a simultaneous decision to not establish nexus in other nearby states. We might also imagine agglomeration or other effects that might predict positive correlations in nexus measures for a group of states within a particular region. To account for these and other related possibilities, we experiment with spatial autoregression (SAR) models of our baseline specification. Additional definitions and source notes for each of the variables discussed in this section are described in Appendix Table A1 . Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for all of our regression variables by year. The average number of online retailers collecting sales taxes was about 39 (among those firms in our data) in 2006. While that number rose to 92 in 2012, recall that this is primarily driven by an increase in the number of firms in our data over time. The companies with nexus in the average state represented about 60 percent of total online sales among the companies in our data in 2006, and the share falls slightly and then rebounds during our period of analysis, primarily as a result of our gradual inclusion of more, and generally smaller, online retailers in the middle years. Looking at the data for Nexus 3, we see that the average state is connected to about 1.4 percent of the total online sales in our data based on (1) the companies that have nexus in the state and (2) the state's share of total national online sales in each company (which, as described above, is based on the state's share of total national sales tax collections). The trend over time in Nexus 3 was similar to that observed for Nexus 2.
Recent state sales tax history suggests a shrinking tax base alongside slowly-growing tax rates in an effort to maintain constant revenue streams. Our data reflect this, with the average state sales tax rate growing from just 5. Combined Table 2 reports our main results, and two models are included for each of the three nexus measures. The first focuses on state sales tax characteristics and state personal income and the second adds the state corporate income tax variables. We estimate reduced form equations to look for evidence that the policy variables move with our nexus measures and do not purport to identify causality.
A. Effect of State Characteristics on Nexus
All equations reveal the importance of a state's market, as measured by state personal income, on the nexus decision. Size is proxied by personal income rather than population because income is presumed to be a better indicator of market size. The direct effect of state size is always a positive determinant of nexus, demonstrating that it is desirable for firms to be near their markets. In this regard, it is important to remember that many large online merchants that remain in our data, such as Best Buy and Sears, are predominantly bricks and mortar firms that have a compelling reason to be near large markets that is independent of their online activities. Pure online firms may have less incentive to be near their customers, but even these firms may have incentives to locate fulfillment centers near large markets, as Amazon.com has been doing in recent years. This result is also consistent with the significant home state effect found by Einav et al. (2014) , who find that trade decreases with distance because consumers have a preference for purchases from home or from nearby vendors. Notice that the direct effect of size is generally consistent across model specifications within each nexus definition.
Effects of the tax policy variables must be discerned by combining the direct and interaction effects. The direct effects of the sales tax rate and sales tax base have unexpectedly positive coefficients, though the tax rate variable is only significant in three of the six equations and the tax base variable in none of the six equations. The interactions between state size and both sales tax policy variables are negative and more frequently significant than the direct effects. The lack of consistent significant direct effects in many specifications is not totally surprising because the perverse implications for a firm of complying with a high tax rate (or broad base) in terms of compliance costs and potentially lost sales depend primarily on how much consumers from a particular state are purchasing from the firm and not on the level of tax rates or breadth of tax base.
30 Thus, the compliance responsibility and potential lost sales from collecting tax in Rhode Island with its 7.0 percent tax rate may be less important to firms than those in Virginia with a lower 4.0 percent tax rate but roughly eight times the population.
Taking into account both the direct and interaction effects, firms are inclined to create nexus in larger states, but the propensity to do so falls with increases in the sales tax rate (for all three nexus measures) and to a lesser extent in the sales tax base (Nexus 1 only). To help illustrate the combined effects, consider the coefficients on our personal Table 2 Panel Regression Results -Contemporaneous Specifications Notes: Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients followed by state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include year effects. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Nexus 1 = Count of companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 2 = Share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 3 = Tax-collections-weighted share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state.
income and interaction variables for Nexus 1 in Table 2 . The effect on the count of online retailers collecting sales taxes from an additional billion dollars (one unit) of personal income is the 0.466 direct effect, minus 0.016 times the sales tax rate (in percent) and minus 0.0004 times the sales tax base (also in billions). The effects of the sales tax rate and base are never high enough in any state to offset the direct effect of higher personal income on nexus -firms always prefer to locate in larger states.
To give this a bit more texture, consider the cases of Colorado and Tennessee, two states with similar personal incomes and sales tax bases but different sales tax rates. Colorado's state sales tax rate is 2.9 percent, and Tennessee's rate is 7 percent. Both states have similar personal income of approximately $240 billion -$250 billion, but Tennessee's 2012 sales tax base of just over $93 billion exceeds Colorado's of about $79.4 billion. Using the coefficients estimated in the Nexus 1 regression, it would take about $3.15 billion in additional personal income to add an additional firm in Tennessee versus $2.58 billion in Colorado (a difference of more than $570 million) because of the sales tax rate and base differences. Thus, greater market size attracts firm nexus more rapidly in states with lower sales tax rates and narrower bases. In sum, the results suggest a clear propensity for firms to reduce the likelihood of establishing collection responsibility in large states as sales tax rates rise and/or sales tax bases broaden, but the effects of a large market still dominate.
The combined effect of the sales tax rate on Nexus 1 includes the positive direct effect of 6.635 for each additional percentage point of the tax rate, minus the interaction effect of 0.016 times personal income. The overall combined effect of the sales tax rate is thus negative for state-years where personal income exceeds $415 billion (for eight states) and, of course, the size of the combined effect falls as personal income rises for all states. These results are consistent with expectations. The data suggest a negative marginal effect on nexus in larger states with higher sales tax rates because of the significant market impacted by the tax. Higher rates are less problematic in smaller states. While the direct and indirect effects of the state tax rate are not statistically significant for Nexus 2, in the case of Nexus 3, the combined effect is negative for state-years where personal income exceeds $275 billion. While the general influence of the sales tax base is broadly similar to the sales tax rate, the direct effect of the sales tax base is never statistically significant and the interaction between base and personal income is only statistically significant (yet very small) for Nexus 1.
The longer a state has been a member of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, the fewer online firms that have nexus in that state. The SSTP variable is not statistically significant in our Nexus 2 and Nexus 3 specifications, however. Amazon laws are statistically significant with our simpler Nexus 3 specification and suggest a tendency for the laws to assert nexus over some new firms.
None of the corporate income tax variables is significant in any equation, with the exception of the top corporate tax rate and the corporate-sales tax rate interaction in the Nexus 1 equation. Negative coefficients would be expected if firms choose not to establish nexus in states with less attractive corporate income tax structures. The corporate tax variables could affect nexus through their influence on business location decisions or because firms link corporate tax compliance and sales tax compliance decisions. The result is consistent with the fact that corporate tax nexus and sales tax nexus are legally based on different concepts, as was discussed above. 31 However, the lack of any broad significance in the nexus estimates differs from a number of other studies that find corporate taxes have significant effects on business location (for example, Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007; Funderburg et al., 2013) . One explanation is that previous research has focused on manufacturers or general business locations rather than the retail firms and e-tailers contained in this study. Corporate tax structures may have smaller implications for retailers, with factors such as access to markets and sales taxes increasing in importance. Also, while sales tax nexus requires physical presence, the effects of some of the concepts of physical presence (such as being in the local phone book) may be too small to be detected in business location studies. That is, in some cases sales tax nexus may be based on limited presence that entails few jobs or limited investment, measures that are often the dependent variables in business location studies. Below, we examine the relationships between sales tax nexus and sales tax revenues and broader economic activity.
As noted above, one concern with our baseline approach is the impact of Amazon nexus on state values for Nexus 2. Specifically, states with Amazon nexus will have dramatically higher values because Nexus 2 is just the sum of total online sales by companies with nexus (regardless of the destination of the sale) divided by total online sales for all online retailers. To explore the implications of Amazon nexus, we estimated two variations of our Nexus 2 models. Our intent is to investigate the importance of Amazon laws in our analysis, and not to study the behavior of firms excluding Amazon; because Amazon represents a large and growing share of online sales, we believe it would be inappropriate for the study to omit Amazon and base conclusions on the effects of all other e-tailers. First, we dropped state-years with Amazon nexus (Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Washington in all years, plus New York in 2008 and beyond) . Second, we kept those state-years in the data but instead inserted an indicator variable for Amazon nexus. Results are provided in Appendix Table A2 along with the baseline Nexus 2 results from Table 2 for comparison. This exercise reveals the importance of the Amazon state-years for Nexus 2. Specifically, when we remove them from the model, personal income is found to have a negative impact on Nexus 2 but the interactions between personal income and the sales tax rate and base variables have a positive sign. When we include the Amazon state-year, personal income no longer has a statistically significant impact on Nexus 2 (but the Amazon dummy is highly significant and positive, as expected). Thus, our finding of a positive impact of personal income on Nexus 2 is driven entirely by Amazon state-years. While online retailers are generally attracted to larger states (based on Nexus 1 results), it is not necessarily the case this attraction is more important for larger online retailers (other than Amazon) than for smaller online retailers.
Another potential concern with our baseline approach is that state tax policies might have actually responded to sales tax nexus trends. To address this possible policy endogeneity, we re-estimated the six regression equations in Table 2 after lagging all independent variables by one year.
32 Results for Nexus 1 were largely consistent with those in Table 2 ; the only exception is that the SSTP membership variable has a marginally-significant positive impact in the lagged setting. Nexus 2 and Nexus 3 showed a bit more sensitivity to the use of lagged independent variables. Specifically, lagged personal income is not a significant factor for either measure, but its interaction with the sales tax base becomes significant but very small. The lagged sales tax rate and the SSTP membership variable both have negative impacts on Nexus 2 only.
In sum, a comparison of the contemporaneous models in Table 2 and the lagged models reveals that most of the interesting variation appears to be of the cross-sectional variety (i.e., differences across states) rather than within-state over time. Differences in results might also suggest that the time period in question could be an important factor, as the lagged specifications include pre-recessionary years.
In one final check on our baseline analysis, we consider the potential impact of correlations across space -specifically among bordering states -in a series of SARs.
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While our SAR results for Nexus 2 and Nexus 3 are virtually identical to those in Table  2 , we experience a loss of statistical significance for the sales tax rate and the interactions between personal income and the sales tax rate and base in our Nexus 1 SAR. Our basic conclusion still holds: the most important determinant of nexus variation appears to be the size of the state's market as indicated by personal income, which has a positive effect in all six specifications. Additionally, the effect of personal income is mitigated somewhat by increases in the sales tax rate in our Nexus 2 and Nexus 3 specifications.
B. Effect of Nexus on Revenues and Employment
Our earlier analysis focused on the determinants of firms' decisions on where to establish nexus across states. We next examine the relationship between nexus and three issues that are of great concern to the states: sales tax receipts, total employment, and retail employment. Nexus is expected to have an unambiguously non-negative relationship with all three state activity measures. We test these relationships using a very parsimonious reduced-form state fixed-effects panel model with fixed effects for time, personal income, nexus, the sales tax rate, years of membership in the SSTP, and the existence of Amazon laws. Our intent is to provide initial evidence on whether nexus by relatively large e-retailers is important to states, though we are not able to test for causality.
Results from the reduced-form equations for sales tax collections are reported in Table  3 . Nexus is entered in the equations as an index of state values relative to the mean, where the mean index is one hundred. We use an index to account for changes in the calculation of nexus due to the changing composition of firms over time. 34 Nexus is entered separately and interacted with the sales tax rate in the equations. The primary result from Table 3 is that sales tax collections appear to increase with years of SSTP membership. Some firms have voluntarily collected the sales tax for SSTP states, which may explain the revenue effect. Overall, we find little evidence that states with more firms with nexus have higher tax revenues. This is consistent with residents shifting their shopping to firms that do not have nexus when other firms establish nexus and provides some evidence of why firms are hesitant to create nexus in large states with high sales tax rates.
Turning to the employment models in Table 4 , we find that greater e-tailer nexus is associated with higher retail employment in states with Nexus 1 and Nexus 3, but the impact falls with the sales tax rate. The positive effect demonstrates that nexus tends to rise to the level that generates employment, though the legal determination of nexus 34 The year fixed effects variable performed this function in the preceding models. Notes: Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients followed by state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include year effects. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Nexus 1 = Count of companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 2 = Share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 3 = Tax-collections-weighted share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state. Notes: Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients followed by state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include year effects. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Nexus 1 = Count of companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 2 = Share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state. Nexus 3 = Tax-collections-weighted share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state.
does not necessarily require employees in a state. The direct effect of nexus combined with the interaction with the sales tax rate turns negative at tax rates approximately between 4 and 6 percent, which means the effect is generally negative for states with moderate-to-high sales tax rates, especially those above the median (6.0 percent). This is consistent with the Einav et al. (2014) result that the gain in terms of home-state sales from locating an e-commerce firm in a state is smaller as the sales tax rate goes up. The relatively lower sales to home-state users at higher sales tax rates translate into less employment associated with those firms. The interaction term also indicates lower employment in states with higher sales tax rates, an effect that increases with more e-commerce nexus. To be more precise, the positive direct effect of the sales tax rate in our Nexus 1 models is offset by the negative interaction between the sales tax rate and the nexus index, such that the combined effect of the tax rate on employment is negative for most states. Years of membership in the SSTP has no relationship with employment in Table 4 , while Amazon laws appear to be associated with greater employment in our Nexus 1 models.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the extent to which state tax policies influence firms' willingness to create sales tax nexus, with a focus on the effects of sales tax and corporate income tax characteristics. We find that firms are more likely to have nexus in large states (as measured by personal income), likely because of the desirability of being near customer markets and because firms are more likely to start up in large states. While our data do not permit us to separate these two effects (indeed, both may be present and important), this is an interesting question for future research. The effect of policy on nexus decisions appears to be relatively immediate and a function of current fiscal variables. Both higher sales tax rates and a broader sales tax base serve to reduce the propensity for firms to have nexus in larger states, particularly in our baseline equations. Overall the results suggest a tendency on the part of firms to avoid nexus in above-average-sized states with high sales tax rates. Little cross-tax relationship is found between corporation income tax features and sales tax nexus. States appear to have an incentive to encourage nexus-creating activity because retail employment increases with nexus in states with low sales tax rates.
These results suggest that state efforts to either reduce sales tax rates or shrink sales tax bases to attract online retailers are not likely to be fruitful, as those retailers are concerned primarily with considerations they find to be more important, such as the size of the market and access to it. There is perhaps no greater example of this in recent history than Amazon's recent decision to support the Marketplace Fairness Act, which would allow states to require certain online retailers to collect and remit sales taxes on purchases by their residents. While Amazon historically resisted nexus-establishing actions in most states and fought state efforts to assert nexus, the company's desire to be closer to its markets now apparently dominates most of its prior concerns about the impact of collecting sales tax on its sales. Amazon's lobbying strategy suggests that it also wants its online competitors to collect sales taxes.
To be sure, our results are based on a relatively small sample of the largest online retailers. While smaller retailers might indeed be more sensitive to state tax rates and bases, the impact of their actions on overall online retail sales (and the associated collection of online sales taxes) is relatively small. Future research could explore these issues by broadening the sample of online retailers for which state nexus information is available. Notes: Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients followed by state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include year effects. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Nexus 2 = Share of total national online sales by companies with nexus in the state.
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